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INTRODUCTION 
In a marketing presentation to investors, real estate investment fund Airo 
Capital Management described its vision for a new, multifamily residential 
development in Baltimore, Maryland.1  The market-rate rental project 
would include 423 residential units, 212 parking spaces, and “additional 
amenities.”2  Full-color “design concept” photos depicted a rooftop bar; a 
long outdoor pool glowing in night lights; a game room featuring retro Pac-
Man machines and a grey pool table; and a mirrored gym full of 
aspirational new exercise equipment.3 
The proposed location was “in the heart of Baltimore City . . . and 
minutes from Johns Hopkins, the University of Maryland, and Mercy 
Medical Center.”4  According to the developer, the area is “one of 
Baltimore’s fastest growing areas with new large-scale developments 
surrounding the site underway.”5  The neighborhood has “consistently 
attracted more tourists, higher incomes and greater retail spending 
compared to inland locations,” and its recent population growth has been 
fueled primarily by “well-educated millennials, with Baltimore’s highest 
earning income brackets being clustered around the waterfront.”6 
The neighborhood is also an Opportunity Zone, a specially designated 
area where projects are eligible for tax-subsidized financing under a new 
federal tax law.7  The Opportunity Zones law was originally pitched as a 
tool to help fight urban poverty and improve distressed communities.8  But 
nothing in the law prevents developers like Airo from forming a specialized 
investment entity called an Opportunity Fund to finance its luxury project 
with tax-subsidized capital.  So, it did.  Seeking to take advantage of the tax 
 
 1. See The Village at Fallsway: Multifamily Development, Baltimore, Maryland, AIRO 




.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8A8-AK6T] (last visited Sept. 23, 2021). 
 2. Id. at 3. 
 3. See id. at 23. 
 4. Id. at 3. 
 5. Id. at 9. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Opportunity Zones, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/opportunity-zones [https://perma.cc/28CU-TX5Q] (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2021); see also I.R.C. § 1400Z-1. 
 8. Robert Frank, ‘Opportunity Zones’ Fall Short on Helping Low-Income 
Communities, Study Finds, CNBC (June 17, 2020, 12:50 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/17/opportunity-zones-fall-short-on-helping-low-income-
communities-study.html [https://perma.cc/AHP5-QQ4R]. 
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preference, Airo created an Opportunity Fund and began seeking 
Opportunity Zone investors through an online platform that connects 
developers with investors.9  At the time this Essay was written, Airo was 
seeking $34,000,000 in Opportunity Fund equity to help finance the 
$113,000,000 project.10 
It is not hard to see why many anti-poverty advocates are skeptical of the 
new Opportunity Zones tax preference and the tax incentive approach in 
general.  Yet, long before there were Opportunity Zones, there were New 
Markets Tax Credits (NMTCs).11  Like Opportunity Zones, the federal 
NMTC program subsidizes investment in low-income areas.12  And like 
Opportunity Zones, the NMTC has been criticized for funding projects that 
may be more likely to spur gentrification than to benefit low-income 
communities.13  But unlike Opportunity Zones, the NMTC has often been 
used to support a variety of impact-investment projects, including 
community facilities like YMCAs; nonprofit activities like soup kitchens, 
youth centers, and job training sites; and, sometimes, housing (always with 
an affordable component).14  So far, there is little indication that 
Opportunity Funds have been used to support many of these types of 
projects.15 
 
 9. See The Village at Fallsway, OPPORTUNITY EXCH., 
https://www.theopportunityexchange.com/projectDetail/1148/ [https://perma.cc/C79C-
YV8Z] (last visited May 7, 2021). 
 10. Id. 
 11. I.R.C. § 1400Z-1; I.R.C. § 45D. 
 12. DONALD J. MARPLES & SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34402, NEW MARKETS 
TAX CREDIT: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (2019), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45152.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7F48-WV35]. 
 13. See generally Roger M. Groves, The De-Gentrification of New Markets Tax Credits, 
8 FLA. TAX REV. 214 (2007) (arguing the NMTC subsidizes gentrification). 
 14. See infra notes 37–43 and accompanying text. 
 15. Due to low program transparency, it is difficult to know how many Opportunity 
Funds are being used for mission-driven investment. It is clear that most Opportunity Fund 
money is being used for real estate development. See Mary Burke Baker, Opportunity Zones 
Aren’t Just for Real Estate Development, NAIOP (2019), https://www.naiop.org/Research-
and-Publications/Magazine/2019/Spring-2019/Business-Trends/Opportunity-Zones-Arent-
Just-for-Real-Estate-Development [https://perma.cc/K29M-FTDR]. It is also clear that at 
least some mission-driven investors exist, but that they have faced significant challenges 
attracting funding. See BRETT THEODOS ET AL., AN EARLY ASSESSMENT OF OPPORTUNITY 
ZONES FOR EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: NINE OBSERVATIONS ON THE USE OF 
INCENTIVE TO DATE 18 (2020), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102348/early-assessment-of-ozs-for-
equitable-development-projects_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J94-9UU7] (“A key challenge[] 
smaller community-oriented high social impact projects have faced is the inability to attract 
OZ capital at below-market returns.”). Google searches related to nonprofits and 
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This Essay explains one reason why these two tax incentive programs 
look so different: where the design of the NMTC creates opportunities for 
nonprofits to participate in the impact-investment process, the design of the 
Opportunity Zones law creates barriers.  Nonprofit participation in NMTC 
deals is supported by specific incentives for debt investment in low-income 
communities, the use of tax credit monetization, and favorable treatment 
under banking regulations.  The absence of parallel features in the 
Opportunity Zones context creates significant barriers to nonprofit 
participation in Opportunity Zones deals.  Ultimately, these barriers limit 
the types of projects pursued by most Opportunity Funds. 
This Essay proceeds as follows.  Section I.A describes how the NMTC 
has been used to subsidize mission-driven investment in projects that serve 
low-income populations.  It argues that one reason the NMTC program can 
support mission-driven investment is that nonprofit organizations are 
common program participants.  Section I.B describes three ways that 
nonprofits participate in NMTC deals as borrowers, nonprofit parents of 
financial intermediaries, and leverage providers.  Part II analyzes whether 
similar opportunities exist for nonprofits to participate in Opportunity Zone 
deals, and it argues that, for the most part, they do not.  It identifies several 
barriers to nonprofit participation in Opportunity Zone deals, including 
statutory limitations that prohibit debt investment in low-income 
communities, the absence of monetization, and uncertainty about how 
Opportunity Zone investment will be treated under banking regulations.  
This research is essential not only for understanding how structural features 
of the Opportunity Zones law affect program outcomes but also for 
informing the design of future place-based tax incentives.  
I. MISSION-DRIVEN INVESTMENT AND THE NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT 
A. Impact Investment and the NMTC 
The phrase “place-based policy” refers to strategies that “direct capital 
and resources to locales through a selection or designation process,”16 often 
with the goal of alleviating poverty through mission-driven investment in 
place.17  As used in this Essay, “mission-driven investment” refers 
generally to investment by actors who are “driven primarily by a 
 
Opportunity Zones reveal some commentary and marketing materials but no data to suggest 
that Opportunity Funds are engaging nonprofits with any regularity. 
 16. Edward W. De Barbieri, Supporting Small Businesses in Place, 48 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. (forthcoming Oct. 2021). 
 17. See Nestor M. Davidson, Reconciling People and Place in Housing and Community 
Development Policy Essay, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2009). 
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community development mission” and who seek “to engage residents and 
local leaders in decisionmaking about development in their 
communities.”18  An important goal of placed-based policy is increasing 
the rate and amount of mission-driven investment.  This investment may 
include affordable housing construction or other projects to rehabilitate the 
built environment or improve local amenities. 
In theory, either for-profit or nonprofit investors may participate in 
mission-driven investment.  On the for-profit side, mission-driven place-
based investment is a focus of many “social impact investors,” who claim 
to marry private profits and public benefits in “a ‘win win’ arrangement 
that will allow private investors to solve pressing social problems while 
simultaneously accruing a market or near-market rate of financial return.”19  
Social impact investment is often supported by public policies, including 
the use of place-based tax incentives like the Opportunity Zones incentive, 
which provide tax-based subsidies to private investors who invest in low-
income areas.20 
However, some researchers have argued that social impact investment 
often fails to deliver the promised benefits to low-income communities.21  
For example, one scholar argues that the “strategy extends the imposition 
of market rather than community-driven logics of poverty management, 
reproducing and legitimating a financialized system . . . that reproduces 
impoverishment instead of eradicating it.”22  Similarly, the Opportunity 
Zones law has been described as “extractive,” whereby profit-seeking 
investors capture more value from low-income communities than they 
confer to them.23  Such critiques cast doubt on whether incentives like 
Opportunity Zones can effectively promote mission-driven investment by 
for-profit taxpayers. 
Experience with the NMTC, however, suggests that place-based tax 
incentives can effectively promote mission-driven investment by for-profit 
 
 18. THEODOS ET AL., supra note 15, at V. 
 19. Emily Rosenman, Capital and Conscience: Poverty Management and the 
Financialization of Good Intentions in the San Francisco Bay Area, 40 URB. GEOGRAPHY 
1124, 1125 (2019). 
 20. See Valerie Grunduski & Casey Veach, Opportunity Zones Offer Tax Incentives to 
Impact Investors, PLANTE MORAN (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.plantemoran.com/explore-
our-thinking/insight/2018/09/opportunity-zones-offer-tax-incentives-to-impact-investors 
[https://perma.cc/Z6QZ-NNRR]. 
 21. See Rosenman, supra note 19, at 1126. 
 22. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 23. See Bruce Katz & Ross Baird, From Extractive Investment to Community Wealth, 
PUB. SQUARE (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.cnu.org/publicsquare/2019/09/09/extractive-
investment-community-wealth [https://perma.cc/R8YJ-XDGV]. 
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taxpayers — provided that the incentives create meaningful opportunities 
for nonprofits to participate in the transactions.  Here, some background 
may be helpful. The NMTC was enacted in 2000 to provide an incentive 
for investment in low-income areas.24  The tax credit is claimed by for-
profit investors who contribute capital for use in projects located in low-
income areas.25  As described below, the size of the tax credit equals 39% 
of the value of the investor’s qualified equity investments, claimed over a 
seven-year period.26  These tax credits serve as an incentive to investors 
and a capital subsidy to developers and businesses.27  The mechanism by 
which the tax credits are delivered, however, is somewhat complicated. 
The complexity relates to annual limitations placed on the program’s 
size28  and the administration of the tax credits.  The NMTC is 
administered by the Community Development Financial Institutions 
(CDFI) Fund, which is an office within the Department of Treasury.29  The 
CDFI Fund permits entities that it certifies as Community Development 
Entities (CDEs) to apply for NMTC allocations.30  As explained below, the 
CDEs act as intermediaries between investors and project developers or 
businesses in low-income communities, and as between investors and the 
CDFI Fund. 
Specifically, CDEs apply for tax credit allocations through a competitive 
application process administered by the CDFI Fund.31  If a CDE receives 
an award, it solicits investors who make so-called qualifying equity 
 
 24. See I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1)(A); see also Groves, supra note 13, at 217−18. 
 25. Groves, supra note 13, at 217−18. 
 26. For each of the first three years, the investor receives a credit equal to 5% of the 
total amount paid for the capital interest, and for the remaining four years it receives 6% 
annually. HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, NEW MARKET TAX CREDIT BASICS 1 (2013), 
http://services.housingonline.com/nhra_images/NMTC%20Basics.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G348-PWXG] [hereinafter NMTC BASICS]. Note that the investor does not 
own a direct interest in the project and, therefore, the costs of the project do not affect the 
credit amount. Id. 
 27. Michael Eickhoff & Steve Carter, Accessing Capital Through the New Markets Tax 
Credit Program, 29 J. ST. TAX’N 17, 17 (2011) (explaining that the company receives a 
capital contribution and the investor receives a tax break). 
 28. In 2020, the law authorized $5 billion in tax credits to be allocated that year among 
projects nationwide. Notice of Allocation Availability (NOAA) Inviting Applications for the 
Calendar Year (CY) 2020 Allocation Round of the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) 
Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 59,853, 59,853 (Sept. 23, 2020). 
 29. MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 12, at 1. 
 30. CDE Certification, CMTY. DEV. FIN. INST. FUND, 
https://www.cdfifund.gov/programs-training/certification/cde [https://perma.cc/5LJZ-
QKBV] (last visited July 14, 2021). 
 31. See MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 12, at 2. 
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investments (QEIs) in the CDE.32  The CDE is required to use that capital 
to make debt or equity investments in development projects or businesses 
in low-income communities.33  The phrase “low-income community” is 
defined by statute and generally includes census tracts that have at least a 
20% poverty rate or have a tract median income that does not exceed 80% 
of the area’s median income.34 
Like the newer Opportunity Zones incentive, the NMTC has long been 
criticized for failing to ensure that benefits flow to residents of low-income 
communities.  In my own research, I have described how developer lobbies 
and powerful market actors have helped drive place-based investment tax 
incentives, including the NMTC.35  The NMTC helps provide large 
infusions of capital into projects, enabling new construction, rehabilitation, 
and large development projects.  Apart from the location requirements, the 
statute itself places few restrictions on the types of projects that can be 
supported through the program, which has been blamed for subsidizing 
projects like museums and opera houses that are not well targeted to benefit 
low-income communities.36 
Nevertheless, my analysis provides strong evidence that the NMTC has 
successfully promoted mission-driven investment that is likely to benefit 
low-income communities. Specifically, I collected the addresses of 443 
NMTC projects funded between 2003 and 2018 in five cities (Chicago, Los 
Angeles, New Orleans, New York, and Philadelphia).37  I then used a 
combination of Google satellite images, Google Maps, and general Google 
searches of the addresses to determine what businesses or organizations 
occupied the properties at those locations as of 2019.38  This method 
yielded project-level data that was not otherwise available, providing new 
insight into how NMTC financing has been used.  For example, data 
 
 32. See id. at 1. This investment immediately entitles the investor to tax credits equal to 
39 cents per dollar of QEI, to be earned over a seven-year period. I.R.C. § 45D(a)(2)–(3). 
 33. I.R.C. § 45D(b)(1)(B). 
 34. I.R.C. § 45D(e)(1). 
 35. See Michelle D. Layser, The Pro-Gentrification Origins of Place-Based Investment 
Tax Incentives and a Path Toward Community Oriented Reform, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 745, 
791 (2019). 
 36. See Groves, supra note 13, at 225. 
 37. Michelle D. Layser, NMTC Project Types [hereinafter Layser, NMTC Project 
Types], https://libguides.law.illinois.edu/ld.php?content_id=62879347 
[https://perma.cc/A285-NWHN] (last updated July 16, 2019) (on file with University of 
Illinois College of Law Library Research Guides). Project addresses were obtained from a 
dataset maintained by the private accounting firm Novogradac LLP. See QLICIs by State, 
NOVOGRADAC, https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/new-markets-tax-credits/qlicis-
state [https://perma.cc/VV35-6JH3] (last visited May 10, 2021). 
 38. See Layser, NMTC Project Types, supra note 37. 
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available from the CDFI Fund described many projects simply as 
“redevelopment,”39 but this method shed light on how the redeveloped 
property was being used — whether as a large retail store like Target, a 
community center like the YMCA, a medical facility, or a general office 
space. 
The projects were described in detail and hand coded to categorize the 
type of project at that location.40  Each project was assigned a single 
code.41  This method revealed that the most frequent types of project in the 
sample were education facilities (21%), most of which were charter 
schools.42  The next most frequently appearing project types were mixed-
use apartments and condos (12%), retail and restaurants (9%), medical 
facilities (11%), and homeless and social services (10%).43 
While the impact of any given project will depend on how well the 
project advances solutions to problems faced by a community,44 two points 
are clear from the data: not all of the projects supported by the NMTC 
program were likely to generate significant profit for investors, and many 
appeared to be predominantly mission-driven.  Examples of such mission-
driven investment included homeless shelters, job training centers for low-
income people, employment agencies for low-income people, religious 
missions, social-services nonprofits, family/youth services, food kitchens, 
disability support services, anti-poverty organizations, housing assistance 
organizations, nonprofit law centers, homeless services organizations, anti-
addiction nonprofits, and assisted living facilities.  Few, if any, of these 
projects are the type normally pursued by the for-profit sector. 
 
 39. The CDFI fund releases public data annually, but the data includes only minimal 
information about the types of projects that have been funded. See CDFI Fund, Data 
Releases, CMTY. DEV. FIN. INST. FUND, https://www.cdfifund.gov/documents/data-releases 
[https://perma.cc/KT8W-PM5U] (last visited May 10, 2021). For example, a release may 
describe a project as “Business Financing” or “Real Estate-Rehabilitation-Commercial,” but 
it does not describe the type of business that received financing or the type of commercial 
development. See, e.g., CDFI Fund, NMTC Public Data Release: 2003–2019 Data File, 
CMTY. DEV. FIN. INST. FUND, https://www.cdfifund.gov/sites/cdfi/files/2021-
05/FY_2020_NMTC_Public_Data_Release.xlsx  [https://perma.cc/RHA3-DSW7] (last 
visited May 10, 2021). 
 40. The following 12 codes were used: Apartment/Condos; Community Centers; 
Education; Grocery; Homeless/Social Services; Manufacturing/Wholesale; Medical; 
Museum/Theater/Arts; Office Space; Retail/Restaurants; Other; Unknown. The table in 
Appendix A describes the types of projects included under each code heading. Data on file 
with University of Illinois College of Law Library. See supra note 38. 
 41. See Layser, NMTC Project Types, supra note 37. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Michelle D. Layser, How Place-Based Tax Incentives Can Reduce Geographic 
Inequality, 74 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 42). 
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Most likely, the results of this analysis of NMTC projects suggest that 
nonprofit organizations have participated in many deals, helping to ensure 
that the NMTC promotes mission-driven investment that is likely to benefit 
low-income communities.  The remainder of this Essay is concerned 
primarily with identifying ways that the NMTC and Opportunity Zone 
incentives do — and do not — create opportunities for nonprofits to 
participate in tax-subsidized transactions.  The next Section describes how 
the NMTC creates opportunities for nonprofits to participate in deals, and 
later parts will examine how the different design of the Opportunity Zones 
incentive creates barriers to nonprofit participation. 
B. Opportunities for Nonprofit Participation Created by the NMTC 
Notwithstanding the recent popularity of social impact investment, 
mission-driven investment has traditionally been the domain of the 
nonprofit sector.45  However, many nonprofits are tax-exempt 
organizations with little need for tax deductions and credits.46  This fact 
presents a challenge when designing tax incentives to promote mission-
driven investment.  How can tax preferences be used to support the 
activities of nonprofits that have little use for tax breaks?  The NMTC 
solves this problem by providing tax preferences to for-profit investors who 
contribute to projects that are — at least sometimes — consistent with the 
missions of tax-exempt nonprofits.  Nonprofits participate in these mission-
driven NMTC deals as borrowers, as the nonprofit parents of financial 
intermediaries, and as leverage providers.  As this Section explains, these 
roles for nonprofit participation are supported by specific features of the 
law that create incentives for debt investment in low-income communities, 
opportunities for tax credit monetization, and favorable treatment under 
banking regulations. 
 
 45. See Michelle J. Stecker, Revolutionizing the Nonprofit Sector Through Social 
Entrepreneurship, 48 J. ECON. ISSUES 349, 350−52 (2014) (explaining that the “nonprofit 
sector provides goods and services that public sector governmental actors do not provide, 
and that private for-profit entities do not adequately — or are not able to — provide,” and 
that “social entrepreneurship” is a more recent development). 
 46. Id. at 350. For this reason, tax-based subsidies for charities have generally taken the 
form of tax preferences for taxable donors. For example, the charitable donations deduction, 
which is claimed by taxpayers who donate to tax-exempt charities, presumably functions 
partly as an incentive — to encourage generous donations or investments that would not 
otherwise occur — and partly as a subsidy to nonprofit entities that produce pro-social 
goods and services. See Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3 
COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 23–25 (2011) (distinguishing between subsidies and incentives and 
explaining that “[i]f the deduction is an incentive that causes donors to increase their gifts 
by at least as much as the tax benefit, it is an incentive to the donor and a subsidy to [the] 
charity” (internal citations omitted)). 
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1. Debt Investment Incentives Create Opportunities for                   
Nonprofit Borrowers 
As explained above, the NMTC statute requires CDEs that receive 
NMTC allocations to invest in qualified low-income community 
investments.  The statutory definition of qualified low-income community 
investment includes “any capital or equity investment in, or loan to, any 
qualified active low-income community business.”47  However, as a 
practical matter, almost all qualified low-income community investments 
take the form of a loan.48  In other words, the most common types of 
investment subsidized by the NMTC are loans (usually with below-market-
rate interest) to a business or developer,49 some of which are extended to 
nonprofit borrowers.50  Nonprofits can use these loans to pursue their 
charitable activities.51  It is likely that many of the mission-driven projects 
described above — e.g., homeless shelters, food kitchens, religious 
missions — reflect loans made directly to nonprofit organizations.52 
Nonprofits hoping to receive low-interest loans subsidized through the 
NMTC program may reach out directly to CDEs, or they may work with 
consultants who connect them with CDEs that might fund their projects.53  
If a nonprofit’s project is consistent with the CDE’s investment strategy, 
the CDE may be willing to loan capital to the nonprofit at below-market 
rates.54  Nonprofits across the United States have recently used NMTC-
subsidized capital to fund a wide array of projects.  For example, Wheeler 
Mission Center for Women and Children in Indianapolis is expanding its 
 
 47. I.R.C. § 45D(d)(1)(A). 
 48. See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT: 
UNLOCKING INVESTMENT POTENTIAL 7 (2013), 
https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/occ_insights_nmtc_unlocking_invest
ment_potential_0613.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7KC-DUHJ]. 
 49. See id. at 3 n.16. 
 50. See Michael I. Sanders, How Nonprofit Organizations Can Use the New Markets 
Tax Credit, BLANK ROME LLP 8–9 (2009), 
https://www.blankrome.com/siteFiles/publications//27E9C61B6D14DB754B19C370C5323
1B8.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GFK-3JUF]. 
 51. See id. at 15–16. 
 52. See supra notes 40−43 and accompanying text. 
 53. See Gordon Goldie & Terri Salas, New Markets Tax Credits Can Fill the Gap in 
Your Capital Campaign Caused by COVID-19, PLANTE MORAN (June 22, 2020), 
https://www.plantemoran.com/explore-our-thinking/insight/2020/06/new-markets-tax-
credits-can-fill-the-gap-in-your-capital-campaign [https://perma.cc/A7ED-25W8]. 
 54. NMTC BASICS, supra note 26, at 2 (explaining that CDEs often make loans at below 
market rates). 
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facilities to serve the homeless population in Indiana.55  In Las Vegas, the 
nonprofit Strong Start Academy Wardelle plans to use NMTC-subsidized 
capital “to develop and construct certain improvements to be operated as a 
childhood education facility, a physical and mental health wellness center, 
and other community facilities.”56  Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, 
Greater Pittsburgh Community Food Bank used NMTC funding to help 
expand its food bank facilities.57 
2. Tax Credit Monetization Makes Mission-Driven                         
Investment “Profitable” 
In addition to participating in NMTC transactions on the borrower-side 
of the transaction, nonprofits also participate by facilitating the investment 
process itself.  In this capacity, a nonprofit may participate (i) as the 
nonprofit parent of a CDE subsidiary or (ii) as leverage providers to 
support for-profit equity investment.  In both cases, the CDE’s qualifying 
low-income community investment must be consistent with the nonprofits’ 
tax-exempt purposes.  Often, such mission-driven investment is not likely 
to generate significant profit for investors.  In fact, most NMTC investors 
do not expect the underlying projects to generate significant economic 
returns.  Why, then, do for-profit investors participate in these mission-
driven deals?  One reason is that a technique called tax credit monetization 
makes mission-driven investment “profitable.” 
Tax credit monetization refers to the process by which a future stream of 
value from anticipated tax credits is converted into dollars that can be used 
currently.58  This is accomplished when an investor obtains the rights to 
claim the tax credits when they are available.59  In the context of the 
NMTC, when investors make a qualified equity investment, they 
effectively purchase the right to claim NMTCs as they are earned.  Under 
the statute, the tax credit always equals 39 cents per dollar of qualified 
 
 55. See Wheeler Center for Women & Children (2020), NEW MKTS. TAX CREDIT COAL., 
https://nmtccoalition.org/project/wheeler-center-for-women-children/ 
[https://perma.cc/TP3A-Z8KM] (last visited June 24, 2021). 
 56. Strong Start Academy Wardelle (2020), NEW MKTS. TAX CREDIT COAL., 
https://nmtccoalition.org/project/strong-start-academy-wardelle/ [https://perma.cc/5NV6-
8YYB] (last visited June 24, 2021). 
 57. See Greater Pittsburgh Community Food Bank (2020), NEW MKTS. TAX CREDIT 
COAL., https://nmtccoalition.org/project/greater-pittsburgh-community-food-bank/ 
[https://perma.cc/K497-3UYF] (last visited June 24, 2021). 
 58. See Thomas W. Giegerich, The Monetization of Business Tax Credits, 12 FLA. TAX 
REV. 709, 769−71 (2012). 
 59. Id. 
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equity investment, earned over a seven-year period.60  This amount 
provides a 5% return on investment for the first three years and a 6% return 
on investment for the last four years — a rate of return that, standing alone, 
would be insufficient to motivate most investors.61 
The tax credit monetization process provides an opportunity for 
investors to structure their investments in ways that increase the rate of 
return.62  Specifically, investors add leverage to the tax credit monetization 
structure.63  If enough leverage is added, investors can profit from the tax 
credits themselves, even if a CDE’s underlying investments are 
unprofitable.64  To do this, investors form a leverage fund and make the 
qualified equity contribution through the fund.65  In this way, the investor 
can “purchase” each dollar of (tax credit generating) qualified equity 
investment at a discount. NMTC “pricing” is generally quoted in terms of 
this discount.66  In 2021, NMTC pricing is currently 74 cents per credit in 
the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.67  The balance of the qualified 
equity investment is financed through leverage.68 
The leveraged monetization technique is best illustrated with an 
example.69  Assume that an investor creates a leverage fund.  A Lender 
loans $0.69 to the fund, and the investor contributes $0.31 of equity to the 
fund, yielding one dollar of capital to be contributed to a CDE.  The fund 
then contributes that dollar to a CDE as a qualified equity investment, 
which generates $0.39 of tax credits to be claimed by the investor.  In other 
words, the equity investor paid just under 80 cents per credit ($0.31 
invested / $0.39 credit = $0.795). 
The CDE uses that dollar of investment to make a below-market-rate 
loan to a business or organization that serves a low-income community.  
The leverage fund will use any economic returns from interest collected on 
 
 60. NMTC BASICS, supra note 26, at 3. 
 61. See I.R.C. § 45D(a)(2). 
 62. Giegerich, supra note 58, at 771 (explaining that in both LIHTC and NMTC deals, 
tax monetization is used to provide investors with a targeted internal rate of return). 
 63. See Eickhoff & Carter, supra note 27, at 77. 
 64. See New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) Program Summary, SBFRIEDMAN [hereinafter 
SBFRIEDMAN], https://sbfriedman.com/sites/default/files/
download/NMTC%20Guide%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6Y8-5KM4] (last visited Sept. 
23, 2021). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Brad Elphick, How the Pandemic Has Affected NMTC Equity Pricing and 
Investments, 12 NOVOGRADAC J. TAX CREDITS 1 (2021). 
 68. See SBFRIEDMAN, supra note 64, at 2. 
 69. This example is adapted from a hypothetical described in SBFRIEDMAN, supra note 
64, at 2. 
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the loan to pay debt service to the Lender, leaving little, if any, economic 
returns for the investor.70  However, the entire value of the tax credits 
($0.39) will flow to the investor (who initially contributed only $0.31).71  In 
other words, the value of the tax credits to the investor is 125% of its 
original equity contribution. Even if the contribution is never repaid, the 
investor would receive a 25% rate of return on the investment — generated 
solely from the tax credits — over the seven-year period.  Through 
structures like these, investors can derive an acceptable rate of return 
entirely from the tax credits themselves, and in some cases the initial equity 
contribution may not even need to be repaid.72  The amount of leverage 
required depends on the deal, and the “tax credit markets [have] historically 
set a price of 70 to 80 cents per dollar of tax credit,” with a lower valuation 
in years when credit markets are tight and corporate profits are small.73 
The table in Appendix B shows the rates of return that investors derive 
solely from the tax credits, comparing the unleveraged structure to the 
leveraged example presented above.  Note that under both structures, the 
qualified equity investment is $1 and generates the same 39 cent return.  By 
adding leverage, however, an investor can increase the rate of return from 
5–6% annually to 16–19% annually. 
These monetization structures create at least two significant 
opportunities for nonprofit organizations to participate in NMTC deals.  
First, a nonprofit can create a for-profit subsidiary certified as a CDE.74  
The subsidiary CDE can receive NMTC allocations and solicit qualified 
equity investments from for-profit investors to help fund its mission-driven 
projects.  Even though the CDE’s investments may be low profit, these 
investors may be willing to invest through a leverage fund.75  Because tax 
credit monetization can be used to provide investors with an acceptable rate 
of return, nonprofit-controlled CDEs are able to attract investors for their 
mission-driven projects. 
Second, a nonprofit may participate as the leverage-provider in the 
monetization structure.  In this structure, the for-profit investor creates a 
leverage fund (as described above) and a nonprofit provides the leverage.76  
The nonprofit has the least control over its investment when it functions as 
the leverage-provider; however, the CDE must provide legal assurance to 
 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. at 2. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 12, at 7. 
 74. See Sanders, supra note 50, at 12. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 14. 
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the nonprofit that its activities will be consistent with the nonprofit’s 
charitable purpose.77  As such, the participation of a nonprofit in these 
deals increases the likelihood that the NMTC will be used to subsidize 
mission-driven projects.  Figure 1 in Appendix C describes the three roles 
that nonprofits play in NMTC deals: (1) as borrowers of tax-subsidized 
loans extended by CDEs, (2) as the nonprofit parent of a CDE, and (3) as a 
leverage-provider to facilitate a leveraged tax equity investment. 
3. Financial Regulations Make Low-Profit Mission-Driven          
Investment Worthwhile 
Whether a nonprofit participates as a borrower, the parent of a CDE, or 
as a leverage provider, the CDE’s qualified low-income community 
investments must be consistent with the nonprofit’s tax-exempt purpose.  In 
many cases, that means that an investor must be willing to invest indirectly 
in a project that is unlikely to generate significant economic returns.  As 
this Section has demonstrated, many for-profit investors are willing to take 
this risk because they derive value from the NMTC itself, even when the 
underlying investment is not profitable.  However, one additional feature of 
the NMTC legal framework is also worth noting; NMTC investment is 
promoted by the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). 78 
The CRA requires financial institutions to extend credit and invest in 
low-income communities within their assessment areas.79  Financial 
institutions that fail to meet their CRA obligations may lose privileges, 
such as the right to expand their business.80  Since financial institutions 
receive CRA “credit” for NMTC investments, they are often willing and 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–08. The CRA requires financial institutions to invest in the low-
income communities they service. See id. § 2903. Today, nearly all investment in tax-
subsidized affordable housing and community development projects comes from financial 
institutions motivated primarily by the CRA. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., 
THE DISRUPTION OF THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM: CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES, RESPONSES, AND PROPOSED CORRECTIVES 19 (2009), 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/disruption_of_the_lihtc_program_2
009_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/YA4Z-AMKA] (explaining that the LIHTC investor market has 
narrowed over time to include primarily financial institutions motivated by the CRA); see 
also Investor Trends, NEW MKTS. TAX CREDIT COAL., https://nmtccoalition.org/progress-
report-2019/investor-trends/ [https://perma.cc/4TTX-K8UL] (last visited July 14, 2021) 
(noting that most NMTC investors are financial institutions subject to the CRA and 
motivated by CRA compliance). 
 79. Cassandra Jones Havard, The Community Reinvestment Act, Banks, and the Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit Investment, 26 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 415, 418 
(2017). 
 80. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.02 (2020). 
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able to invest in NMTC projects, even if the expected rate of return is 
relatively low.81  In fact, the overwhelming majority of NMTC investors 
are seeking credit under the CRA.82 
Here, it is worth noting that in the broader context of affordable housing 
and community development, financial institutions are often willing to 
invest in CRA-eligible projects even if they do not expect the investment to 
be profitable.  A striking example of this is sometimes seen in the context 
of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), which employs 
monetization structures similar to those used to monetize the NMTC.83  As 
in the case of the NMTC, LIHTC investors usually size their tax credit 
investments to ensure a positive return on their investment.84  In effect, 
they purchase the tax credits at a discount, thereby building in an 
acceptable rate of return.85 
However, during some particularly competitive periods, some LITHC 
investors have been willing to purchase LIHTCs at a premium — paying 
more than a dollar for each dollar of anticipated tax credits.86  These 
investors know from the outset that their investment is likely to be a 
money-loser.  Yet, these LIHTC investors are not motivated by profits; 
they are motivated by the CRA and the promise that they will receive CRA 
credit for investing in affordable housing.87 
Most NMTC investors are also motivated by the CRA.88  While these 
investors would presumably prefer to receive a positive return on their 
investment, they may be willing to invest in low-profit projects because 
CRA compliance alone has value.  It seems likely that the CRA may affect 
 
 81. See MARTIN D. ABRAVANEL ET AL., URB. INST., NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT (NMTC) 
PROGRAM EVALUATION 65–66 (2013), https://www.urban.org/
sites/default/files/publication/24211/412958-new-markets-tax-credit-nmtc-program-
evaluation.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQ4Y-6WCA]. 
 82. Id. at 66. 
 83. Giegerich, supra note 58, at 771. 
 84. See H. Blair Kincer & Mark O’Meara, A Look at the LIHTC: Past Pricing Trends, 
the Current Market and Future Concerns, 11 NOVOGRADAC J. TAX CREDITS 1, 3 (2020) 
(describing LIHTC pricing trends over time and explaining that, in most markets, LIHTCs 
are purchased at discounted prices). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Donna Kimura, LIHTC Prices Climb and Climb, AFFORDABLE HOUS. FIN. (Aug. 
16, 2016), http://www.housingfinance.com/Finance/lihtc-prices-climb-and-climb_o 
[https://perma.cc/TX2F-ZQXU] (describing LIHTC pricing at $1.03 per $1 of tax credit in 
August 2016); see also Kincer & O’Meara, supra note 84, at 3 (describing CRA-driving 
LIHTC pricing between $1.05 and $1.10 per dollar of credit prior to the 2017 tax reform 
legislation). 
 87. Kincer & O’Meara, supra note 84. 
 88. NEW MKTS. TAX CREDIT COAL., supra note 78. 
1146 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
 
NMTC pricing in the same way that it increases LIHTC pricing, reflecting 
investors’ willingness to accept lower rates of return.  In other words, the 
favorable treatment under the CRA may help make mission-driven 
investment worth it, even if it does not generate much profit. 
In sum, several features of the NMTC create opportunities for nonprofits 
to participate in tax credit deals.  These include the inclusion of loans 
among qualified low-income community investments, the use of 
monetization structures, and the availability of CRA credit for NMTC 
investment.  Theoretically, similar structures could be used by nonprofits to 
take advantage of tax-subsidized financing raised by Opportunity Funds. 
However, the structure of the incentive — and its current status under the 
CRA — make it much more difficult for nonprofits to participate in 
Opportunity Zones deals.  The next Part will analyze the barriers to 
nonprofit participation in Opportunity Zones transactions.  Ultimately, 
these barriers limit the capacity of the Opportunity Zones law to support 
mission-driven projects. 
II. NONPROFIT PARTICIPATION IN OPPORTUNITY ZONES DEALS 
This Essay has demonstrated that the NMTC has been used to promote 
mission-driven investment by providing opportunities for nonprofits to 
participate in NMTC deals.  Early research suggests that similar mission-
driven investment is less common in the context of Opportunity Zones 
deals.89  A recent study showed that Opportunity Zone investment is 
“overwhelmingly concentrated in equity investments in businesses that 
specialize in real estate, construction, and finance.”90  This investment 
“gravitates toward tracts with relatively higher educational attainment, 
income, density, and pre-existing upward income and population growth 
trends,”91 and mission-driven real estate investment, like affordable 
housing, is relatively uncommon.92 
One reason that Opportunity Zone investment differs so dramatically 
from NMTC investment is that fewer opportunities exist for nonprofits to 
participate in Opportunity Zones deals.  In the NMTC context, several 
 
 89. See Patrick Kennedy & Harrison Wheeler, Neighborhood-Level Investment from the 
U.S. Opportunity Zone Program: Early Evidence 4 (U.S. Cong. Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 
Working Paper, 2021), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
57a3c0fcd482e9189b09e101/t/607893b915858d7bd0d198ba/1618514881004/oz_kennedy_
wheeler.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JCM-NX8B]. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 9. 
 92. See Michelle D. Layser, Financing Affordable Housing Through Opportunity Zones, 
19 PITT. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Layser, Financing Affordable Housing]. 
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features of the law create opportunities for nonprofit participation, 
including incentives for debt investment in low-income communities, its 
suitability for monetization, and favorable treatment under the CRA.  In 
contrast, this Part identifies several barriers to nonprofit participation in 
Opportunity Zones deals, including the requirement that Opportunity Funds 
make equity investments in Opportunity Zones, the absence of 
monetization, and uncertainty surrounding the CRA.  As a result, fewer 
opportunities exist for nonprofits to participate in Opportunity Zones 
transactions. 
A. Comparing Opportunity Zones to NMTC 
1. Capital Gains Relief Versus Tax Credits 
To understand the barriers to nonprofit participation in Opportunity 
Zones transactions, it is helpful to review the structure of the law itself, 
including ways that the Opportunity Zones incentive differs from the 
NMTC.  The first key distinction is that, where the NMTC uses tax credits 
to promote development in low-income areas, the Opportunity Zones 
incentive takes the form of tax deferrals and exemptions.  Specifically, the 
Opportunity Zones law provides three possible tax benefits for taxpayers 
who contribute to Opportunity Funds, all of which confer capital gains tax 
relief.93 
Normally, when an appreciated asset is sold, the profits — called capital 
gains — are subject to tax at capital gains rates, which in recent years 
have ranged from 0% to 28%.94  The first tax benefit under the Opportunity 
Zones law is to permit taxpayers to defer paying tax on their capital gains 
from an asset sale until December 31, 2026, provided that they are 
contributed to an Opportunity Fund within 180 days of the sale and all 
other statutory requirements are met.95  The second possible tax benefit is 
the partial exclusion of pre-contribution capital gains.  To receive this 
benefit, taxpayers must leave their money in the fund for specified holding 
periods.96  Depending on when the taxpayer invested in the fund and how 
 
 93. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(a)(1) (“In the case of gain from the sale to, or exchange with, 
an unrelated person of any property held by the taxpayer, at the election of the taxpayer — 
[] gross income for the taxable year shall not include so much of such gain as does not 
exceed the aggregate amount invested by the taxpayer in a qualified opportunity fund during 
the 180-day period beginning on the date of such sale or exchange . . . .”). 
 94. See id. § 1(h). 
 95. See id. § 1400Z-2(b). 
 96. Specifically, a taxpayer who remains invested in the fund for five years may 
increase its basis by 10%. A taxpayer who remains invested in the fund for seven years may 
1148 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
 
long the investment was held, the statute provides for the exemption of up 
to 15% of pre-contribution capital gains.97  The third — and potentially 
most significant — benefit is the total exclusion of post-contribution gains 
from investments held in an Opportunity Fund for at least ten years.98  
These three benefits are unlimited in size and potentially available to any 
taxpayer who invests in an Opportunity Fund.99 
While the initial deferral and potential to partially exclude pre-
contribution capital gains are attractive incentives, it is worth noting that a 
successful project that generates post-investment gains, compounded over 
ten years, could provide taxpayers with tax-free returns that eclipse the tax 
savings associated with the initial deferral.  Taxpayers who anticipate 
significant profits from an investment may find this third benefit 
particularly attractive.  In contrast, taxpayers who do not expect their 
investment to generate significant profit — such as those pursuing mission-
driven investment like affordable housing — may not be as motivated by 
the third incentive.  As a result, the Opportunity Zones law provides the 
strongest incentive package to taxpayers who plan to pursue highly 
profitable projects. 
 
increase its basis by an additional 5% (note that this benefit is only available to taxpayers 
who invested by the end of 2019). Understanding these benefits requires some familiarity 
with the tax basis rules applicable to Opportunity Funds. Under the rules, taxpayers receive 
zero basis for their initial investment in Opportunity Funds. See id. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(i). 
The practical effect of this rule is that if a taxpayer invests $100 in an Opportunity Fund 
(thereby receiving $0 basis) and then sells its fund interest for $100, the taxpayer would 
immediately recognize $100 in capital gains. See id. §§ 741, 1001. Without this rule, a 
taxpayer would ordinarily receive $100 basis for that same investment, allowing the investor 
to sell the interest for zero gain and permanently avoid the capital gains tax. See id. §§ 
358(a)(1), 722. In the same way, the basis step-up rules allow the taxpayers to permanently 
exclude tax on the pre-contribution gains to the extent of the step-up. 
 97. See id. §§ 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iii)−(iv). 
 98. In other words, taxpayers are always required to include at least 85% of capital gains 
from the initial asset sale in 2026, but to the extent that their investment in the Opportunity 
Fund appreciated, those gains are eligible for complete exclusion after ten years. The cost to 
the Treasury of this appreciation exclusion was not included in the original expense estimates 
for the law since it fell outside the ten-year budget window; however, this feature of the law 
could ultimately deliver significant tax breaks to third-party investors who hold their 
investments for the full ten-year period. See SEAN LOWRY & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. 
RSCH. SERV., R45152, TAX INCENTIVES FOR OPPORTUNITY ZONES 9 (2020), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45152.pdf [https://perma.cc/BKT9-9RXS]. 
 99. This structure stands in sharp contrast to the NMTC. As mentioned, the law caps the 
amount of NMTCs that can be allocated each year, and the credits are therefore awarded to 
eligible entities by the government on a competitive basis. See I.R.C. § 45D. 
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2. Equity Subsidy Versus Debt Subsidy 
To receive the capital gains relief described above, the taxpayer must 
invest in a Qualified Opportunity Fund that meets statutory requirements 
related to asset holdings.  To qualify under the statute, Opportunity Funds 
must either (i) directly own property located in the zones (Opportunity Zone 
Business Property) or (ii) own such property indirectly through entities that 
that own a qualified opportunity zone business.100  In either case, the key is 
that an Opportunity Fund is required to own — directly or indirectly — 
property located in an Opportunity Zone.  A fund cannot meet its asset 
holding requirements by making debt investments.  In other words, unlike 
the NMTC, which is primarily used to subsidize debt investment, the 
Opportunity Zones law was designed to subsidize equity investment in low-
income areas.101 
* * * 
These two structural differences between the NMTC and Opportunity 
Zones incentive help ensure that the tax incentives are not duplicative, and 
they help the Opportunity Zones incentive reach a different pool of 
potential investors than the NMTC can reach.  However, these differences 
also present distinct barriers to nonprofit participation in Opportunity 
Zones deals.  As the remainder of this Part will show, nonprofit 
participation in Opportunity Zone deals is likely chilled by the equity 
investment requirement, the absence of monetization, and uncertainty about 
how Opportunity Zone investments will be treated under the CRA. 
B. Barriers to Participation in Opportunity Zones Deals 
1. Equity Investment Requirement 
The requirement that Opportunity Funds make equity investments 
presents a significant barrier to using Opportunity Funds to support the 
activities of tax-exempt nonprofit organizations.  Many nonprofits are 
organized and operated as tax-exempt organizations under section 
 
 100. If the fund owns property directly, then substantially all (90%) of the fund’s assets 
must be comprised of property located in the Opportunity Zone. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 
1.1400Z2(d)-1(b)(1)(i), 1.1400Z2(d)-2(d)(3)(i) (2020). If it owns property indirectly, then 
substantially all (70%) of the entity’s assets must be located in an Opportunity Zone. See id. 
§§ 1.1400Z2(d)-1(b)(1)(ii), (d)(2) (2020). 
 101. John Sciarretti, Michael Novogradac & Peter Lawrence, New Opportunity Zones 
Could Be Used to Finance Rental Housing, NOVOGRADAC (Feb. 23, 2018, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/new-opportunity-zones-could-be-used-
finance-rental-housing [https://perma.cc/T67Y-QKSN]. 
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501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.102  This category of nonprofits is 
commonly referred to as “charitable organizations.”103  Among the 
requirements applicable to a charitable organization is that no part of the 
organization’s net earnings may “inure[] to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual.”104  As a practical matter, the anti-inurement 
requirement means that charitable organizations are prohibited from raising 
capital through equity investment.  This prohibition makes it impossible for 
an Opportunity Fund to satisfy its asset-holding requirements (which must 
be met through equity investments) by providing capital to nonprofits.  As 
a result, the most straightforward way that nonprofits participate in NMTC 
deals — as borrowers of loans obtained from CDEs — is completely 
unavailable in Opportunity Zones transactions. 
2. Absence of Monetization 
A second significant barrier to nonprofit participation in Opportunity 
Zones deals relates to the form of the incentive, which does not require (or 
enable) monetization.  There are at least two reasons why monetization 
structures are not used in this context.  First, tax credit monetization is used 
to advance the value of future benefits to be received.  However, a major 
benefit under the Opportunity Zones law is the current deferral of capital 
gains.  That deferral is earned when taxpayers contribute the sheltered 
dollars in an Opportunity Fund.  No monetization is necessary. 
Second, to the extent that Opportunity Zones do provide future benefits 
— the exemption of post-contribution gains — those benefits are highly 
speculative and not susceptible to monetization.  Monetization is possible 
in the context of the NMTC because the anticipated value of the tax credits 
is relatively certain, as it is clearly defined by the size of a CDE’s tax credit 
allocations.  In contrast, the value of Opportunity Zones tax preferences 
depends on how profitable an Opportunity Fund turns out to be in the 
future.  Investors will not be willing to contribute cash in exchange for a 
benefit that may never materialize. 
Without monetization, two common ways that nonprofits participate in 
NMTC deals are less viable in the context of Opportunity Zones.  First, 
recall that nonprofits participate in NMTC deals as owners of CDEs that 
solicit for-profit investors who claim the tax credits.  In theory, a nonprofit 
could form an Opportunity Fund to pursue its own projects — but without 
 
 102. See Stecker, supra note 45, at 350. 
 103. See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The 
Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 512–13 (2010). 
 104. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
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monetization, many mission-driven projects will be unattractive to 
investors.105  Second, recall that nonprofits participate in NMTC deals as 
leverage providers.  But, here too, the investors may be unwilling to pursue 
mission-driven projects if they do not expect them to be profitable. 
To be clear, there are no legal barriers to either of these structures.  
Nevertheless, for either structure to work, the Opportunity Fund must 
commit to investing in projects consistent with a nonprofit’s exempt 
purpose, and investors must be willing to invest in those mission-driven 
projects.  Ultimately, the absence of monetization means that investors 
cannot rely on monetization to produce an acceptable rate of return.  
Instead, they must bet on the performance of the Opportunity Fund’s 
investments.  Leverage can be added to increase the profits derived from a 
successful investment — but it cannot be used to hedge against the risk that 
an investment may not be successful.  No amount of leverage can ensure 
that Opportunity Zone investors receive a return on their investment even if 
the underlying investment fails.106 
For this reason, investors may be reluctant to participate in transactions 
with nonprofits when the mission-driven projects will be less profitable 
than for-profit endeavors.107  As described below, this barrier is further 
exacerbated by uncertainty surrounding the treatment of Opportunity Zone 
investments under the CRA. 
3. Uncertainty About CRA Credit 
When a financial institution is able to claim CRA credit for a mission-
driven investment, it may be willing to accept a low rate of return.  In the 
contexts of the NMTC and LIHTC, the CRA has proven to be highly 
motivating to financial institution investors.108  However, the CRA is likely 
 
 105. See, e.g., Tracy A. Kaye, Ogden Commons Case Study: A Comparative Look at the 
LIHTC and OZ Tax Incentive Programs, 48 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming Oct. 2021) 
(explaining that affordable housing developer, “[t]he Habitat Co., had a great deal of trouble 
attracting qualified opportunity zone funding because ‘mission-oriented projects struggle to 
compete for attention with higher return projects’” (citation omitted)). 
 106. In contrast, if enough leverage is added to an NMTC deal, an investor may receive 
more value in tax credits than the size of its initial contribution. In such case, the underlying 
investment could become worthless, but the investor would still receive an acceptable 
return. See SBFRIEDMAN, supra note 64, at 2. 
 107. In fact, some observers have estimated that only about 5% to 10% of Opportunity 
Funds will be operated with philanthropic or social-impact missions. See Lydia O’Neal, 
Cottage Industry in Opportunity Zone Data Forms to Fill Vacuum (1), BLOOMBERG TAX 
(Apr. 18, 2019, 5:04 PM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/cottage-industry-
in-opportunity-zone-data-forms-to-fill-vacuum [https://perma.cc/4SBP-FGYQ]. 
 108. See supra notes 78−88 and accompanying text. 
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to be less motivating in the Opportunity Zones context because the status of 
Opportunity Zone investments under the CRA is less certain.  When the 
Opportunity Zones law was first introduced, there was substantial 
uncertainty as to whether any Opportunity Zone investment would satisfy 
CRA obligations.109  Since then, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) has issued regulations confirming that Opportunity Zone 
investment may qualify under the CRA, but only if the underlying 
investment is a type expected to benefit low- or moderate-income 
populations.110 
In the preamble to the regulations, the OCC explained that “[w]hether an 
activity benefits an [low- or moderate-income (LMI)] qualified opportunity 
zone will depend on the facts and circumstances of the activity, including 
whether it is responsive to the needs of LMI individuals, families, and 
communities in the opportunity zone.”111  Though the new regulations 
provide some assurance that Opportunity Zone investment can satisfy CRA 
obligations, the facts and circumstances approach makes the treatment of 
such investments far less certain than in the context of the NTMC or 
LIHTC. 
Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve has yet to clarify whether Opportunity 
Zone investment satisfies CRA requirements for banks under its regulatory 
jurisdiction.  A proposed rule published in October 2020 did not mention 
Opportunity Zones,112 and some commenters have asked the agency to 
“make clear that investments in Opportunity Zones . . . that align with the 
intent of the Community Reinvestment Act . . . in benefitting low- and 
moderate income (“LMI”) individuals and communities are eligible for 
CRA credit.”113  The uncertainty about how the CRA applies to 
Opportunity Fund investment creates an additional barrier to nonprofit 
participation in Opportunity Zone deals.  This is because it dulls an 
incentive that could otherwise help induce financial institutions to 
 
 109. See Bob Ibanez, Opportunity Zones — Giving CRA Credit Where Credit Is Due, 
NOVOGRADAC (Nov. 13, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-
novogradac/opportunity-zones-giving-cra-credit-where-credit-due [https://perma.cc/V6ZJ-
AY53]. 
 110. See Qualifying Activities Criteria, 12 C.F.R. § 25.04(c)(11) (2021). 
 111. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,734, 34,747 (June 5, 
2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 195). 
 112. See generally Community Reinvestment Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 66,410 (proposed Oct. 
19, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228). 
 113. Letter from Catherine Lyons, Dir. of Pol’y & Coals., Econ. Innovation Grp., to Anne 
E. Misback, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. 1 (Feb. 16, 2021), 
https://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/EIG-OZ-Coalition-Comment-Letter-on-CRA-
ANPR-2.16.21.pdf [https://perma.cc/SP3T-N66T]. 
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participate in deals involving nonprofits, notwithstanding the economic 
risks.114 
Thus, the Opportunity Zones incentive is unlikely to be used to support 
the activities of nonprofits — and this may significantly limit the program’s 
potential to benefit low-income communities.  In short, the mission-driven 
investment that is relatively common under the NMTC program is simply 
unlikely to be seen to the same degree in the context of Opportunity Zones. 
C. Layering Opportunity Zones and the NMTC 
At least one other option remains for nonprofits to participate in 
Opportunity Funds deals: layer Opportunity Zones with the NMTC.  An 
important commonality between Opportunity Zones and NMTC is that the 
programs significantly overlap in the places that they target.  The 
Opportunity Zones statute made all NMTC-eligible tracts eligible for 
Opportunity Zone designation, as well as certain contiguous census tracts 
and tracts located in Empowerment Zones.115  A subset of those eligible 
tracts were designated by state governors as Qualified Opportunity 
Zones.116  As a result, a significant number of Qualified Opportunity Zones 
are also NMTC eligible.117 
Because many census tracts are eligible for both NMTC and Opportunity 
Zone investment, the two incentives are occasionally paired.118  For 
example, it is possible for a CDE to meet the definition of a Qualified 
Opportunity Fund if it satisfies the asset holding requirements.119  
 
 114. However, note that even with CRA credit, many financial institutions may be unable 
to participate in Opportunity Zones deals because they typically do not have capital gains to 
invest in Opportunity Funds. See Dirk Wallace & Michael Novogradac, Treasury Should 
Revise Opportunity Zones Guidance to Encourage Affordable Rental Housing, 
NOVOGRADAC (Sept. 30, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-
novogradac/treasury-should-revise-opportunity-zones-guidance-encourage-affordable-
rental-housing [https://perma.cc/WV4L-QKK3]; see also Layser, Financing Affordable 
Housing, supra note 92. 
 115. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(e). 
 116. See I.R.S. Notice 2018-48, I.R.B. 2018-28. While the I.R.S notice notes a state’s 
Chief Executive Officer may nominate census tracts, a state’s Chief Executive Officer is the 
state governor. See LOWRY & MARPLES, supra note 98, at 1 (stating that a state’s chief 
executive officer is “generally the governor”). 
 117. See Brian Blacker, Stacked Incentives: NMTC Eligibility and Opportunity Zones, 
POLICYMAP (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.policymap.com/2019/09/stacked-incentives-
nmtc-eligibility-and-opportunity-zones/ [https://perma.cc/ZZ6Q-DN77]. 
 118. See THEODOS ET AL., supra note 15, at 26. 
 119. See George Barlow & John Sciarretti, Pairing NMTCs with Opportunity Zone 
Incentives, NOVOGRADAC (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.novoco.com/periodicals/articles/pairing-nmtcs-opportunity-zone-incentives 
[https://perma.cc/3R4N-6UXH]. 
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Alternatively, it may be possible for an Opportunity Fund to create its own 
CDE subsidiary, in which the CDE meets the definition of a qualified 
opportunity zone business.  In these cases, nonprofits may be able to 
participate in the transaction in the same ways that they would participate 
in any other NMTC deal. 
However, “CDEs seeking to pair OZ incentives with NMTCs will be 
required to make their qualified low-income community investments 
(QLICIs) in the form of equity investments . . . which may not be generally 
consistent with their approved business strategy.”120  Since most CDEs 
specialize in loans, the CDE may need to seek approval from the CDFI 
Fund in order to make these equity investments.121  At a minimum, these 
transactions will be more complicated than deals that use only one 
incentive, requiring more advisors — and higher expenses — to close the 
deals.  For these reasons, it is unlikely that investors will seek to pair the 
incentives often enough to create significant opportunities for nonprofits to 
participate in Opportunity Zones deals. 
CONCLUSION 
When tax incentives are designed in ways that create opportunities for 
nonprofits to participate in investments, a wide variety of mission-driven 
investments can be supported.  This Essay has analyzed nonprofit 
participation in NMTC transactions in order to gain insights into the 
barriers to nonprofit participation in Opportunity Zones investment.  It has 
identified several barriers, including the requirement that Opportunity 
Funds make equity investments, the absence of monetization structures, 
and uncertainty about how the investments will be treated under the CRA.  
Together, these barriers make it more difficult for nonprofits to participate 
in Opportunity Zone deals. 
This is not to say that nonprofits never participate in Opportunity Zone 
deals or that Opportunity Funds are never mission-driven.  To the contrary, 
philanthropies and other nonprofits do participate in Opportunity Zones 
deals, and some Opportunity Fund investors are highly committed to 
mission-driven investment.122  Nevertheless, this Essay has demonstrated 
that the design of the tax incentive makes it more difficult for nonprofits to 
participate in Opportunity Zones deals than in NMTC deals, despite 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See generally THEODOS ET AL., supra note 15 (describing the use of Opportunity 
Zones for mission-driven investment); Kaye, supra note 105 (describing how an affordable 
housing project was financed using Opportunity Fund equity). 
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similarities between the two incentives.  For this reason, it is likely that the 
mix of investments subsidized through the Opportunity Zones law will 
include fewer mission-driven projects than what could be promoted under 
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APPENDIX A 
Type Codes Includes: 
Apartments/Condos Construction of for-sale or rental housing, Mixed-use 
residential buildings, Mixed-income housing, Single-
family residence 
Community Center Family centers, community gardens, youth centers, 
recreation centers, church community centers, 
Salvation Army community centers, YMCA 
community centers, Boys & Girls Club community
centers 
Education Charter schools, childcare/early learning centers, 
schools for the disabled, libraries, university buildings, 
children’s science centers, after-school programs 
Grocery Full-service grocery stores, butcher shops, food co-ops 
Homeless/Social Services Homeless shelters, job training centers for low-income 
people, employment agencies for low-income people, 
Religious missions, social-services nonprofits, 
family/youth services, food kitchens, disability support 
services, anti-poverty organizations, housing assistance 
organizations, nonprofit law centers, homeless 
services, anti-addiction nonprofits, assisted living 
facilities 
Manufacturing/Wholesale Manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, warehouse 
storage space, industrial tenants, meat packers, food
distribution, food catering 
Medical Medical facilities, rehab centers, Diabetes relief clinics, 
pharmacies, specialized medical clinics, family health 
centers, HIV/AIDS clinics, health and wellness centers 
(excluding recreation centers), health literacy centers, 
health and wellness centers for the elderly, hospitals, 
medical transit, medical supply stores 
Museum/Theater/Arts Performing arts centers, concert halls, fine art centers,
cultural museums, art museums, galleries 
Office Space Office buildings, office space (unknown tenants), 
creative community space (e.g., makers space / small
business owners) 
Retail/Restaurants Malls, strip malls, small retailers, restaurants, fast food, 
auto repair, financial services (e.g., banks) 
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Other Hotels, laboratories, events facilities, bus terminals, 
transportation services, self-storage facilities, military 
tenants, business community centers, shipping docks,
movie/production studios, recording studios, funeral 
homes, dog spas 
Unknown Property use inconclusive based on Google Satellite










($1 equity + $0 debt) 
Leveraged Structure 
($0.31 equity + $0.69 
debt) 
y1 0.05 5% 16% 
y2 0.05 5% 16% 
y3 0.05 5% 16% 
y4 0.06 6% 19% 
y5 0.06 6% 19% 
y6 0.06 6% 19% 
y7 0.06 6% 19% 
 
APPENDIX C 
Figure 1: Sample NMTC Structures Engaging Nonprofits 
